Sven Giegold
Mitglied der Grünen/EFA-Fraktion im Europaparlament

Sprecher Europagruppe Grüne
„Kommt, wir bauen das neue Europa!“

Deutsche NGO-Kritik an Regeln gegen Nahrungsmittelspekulation

In den letzten Tagen haben sich einige deutschsprachige NGOs  wie Attac und foodwatch kritisch zu den neuen EU-Regeln gegen Spekulation mit Nahrungsmitteln und Rohstoffen geäußert. Ihre Bewertung ist im Kern negativ z.B. „keine strenge Regulierung“, „Wetten auf Nahrungsmittelpreise können weitgehend ungehindert weiter gehen“, „dürften wirkungslos sein“, „fauler Kompromiss“  „Wettlauf nach unten“, „mit großen Schwächen“, „ungenügend“, usw..

Dagegen äußerten sich NGOs aus anderen EU-Ländern (Oxfam, World Development Movement, Brot für Alle Schweiz) und Oxfam Deutschland und Misereor im Kern positiv, ohne Kritikpunkte zu verschweigen. Sie feierten die neuen Positionsgrenzen für Spekulation mit Nahrungsmittel- und Rohstoffderivaten als großen Erfolg der kritischen Zivilgesellschaft, so wie ich es auch getan habe.

Welchen Reim soll man sich darauf machen?

Im Kern bringen die NGOs drei Kritikpunkte:

ESMA vs. Nationale Aufseher: Zurecht wird kritisiert, dass nicht die europäische Marktaufsichtbehörde ESMA die Positionsgrenzen setzt, sondern die nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden. Auch wir hätten lieber eine zentrale Zuständigkeit bei dieser Frage gesehen. Allerdings ist völlig überzogen, davon zu sprechen, dass nun ein Wettlauf nach unten droht oder gar keine absoluten Grenzen gelten würden. Denn ESMA legt nicht nur die Berechnungsmethode fest, sondern damit faktisch auch die Höhe. ESMA kontrolliert auch die Anwendung der Regeln durch die nationalen Aufseher. Das Europaparlament überwacht die Europaäische Kommission und die ESMA.

Zielbestimmung: Die Finanzmarktrichtlinie Mifid spricht leider bei den Zielen der Positionsgrenzen nicht ausdrücklich von „exzessiver Spekulation“. Das ist bedauerlich und schon im Europaparlament an den Mehrheitsverhältnissen gescheitert. Das ist umso bedauerlicher, da der Begriff im parallelen Amerikanischen Regelwerk (Dodd-Franck-Act) vorkommt. Allerdings sind die Ziele „marktverzerrende Positionen“ und „Marktmissbrauch“ klar genug formuliert. Der politische Wille ist eindeutig und die EU-Kommission hat klargemacht, dass sie ihn auch durchsetzen wird.

Verbot von bestimmten Finanzmarktprodukten: Die Marktrichtlinie Mifid definiert insgesamt keine verbotenen Produkte, auch nicht bei der Nahrungsmittelspekulation. Insofern sollte man das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen auch nicht kritisieren. Allerdings schafft die neue Mifid erstmals die Kompetenz von ESMA, gefährliche Finanzprodukte tatsächlich zu verbieten. Nachdem das Europaparlament schon vor einigen Jahren sie dazu grundsätzlich befähigt hat, erfolgte nun die Ermächtigung. Damit wird es nun möglich, mit Aussicht auf Erfolg Kampagnen für das Verbot toxischer Finanzprodukte durchzuführen.

Bemerkenswert ist, dass diese Kritikpunkte Details betreffen im Vergleich zu den ursprünglichen Forderungen. Noch vor einem Jahr sah es nicht so aus, dass es überhaupt verbindliche Positionsgrenzen für Nahrungsmittelspekulation geben würde. Nun haben wir durchgesetzt:

–          Positionsgrenzen kommen verbindlich

–          Sie gelten überall verbindlich in Europa

–          Sie gelten auch für den OTC-Handel

–          Sie gelten auch für physisch gesettelte Produkte

–          usw.

Daher sollten wir uns wirklich alle vor allem freuen! Die Kritik von Attac und Foodwatch ist in ihrer überzogenen Schärfe geeignet, Politikverdrossenheit zu schüren. In den letzten vier Jahren habe ich bei keinem Finanzmarktthema auch nur annähernd so viel BürgerInnenengagement und –druck erlebt. Mehr noch: Ich war erstaunt, wie sehr dieser Druck in Veränderung der Positionen der europäischen Konservativen und einiger wichtiger Mitgliedsländer mündete. Das jetzt erreichte Ergebnis setzt nicht nur das Instrument der Positionsgrenzen gegen den ursprünglichen Vorschlag der EU-Kommission verbindlich durch. Es wurden auch die in den Texten des Rates und des Europaparlaments verankerten Schlupflöcher fast durchweg geschlossen. Wenn danach die Kernbotschaft gegenüber all den mobilisierten BürgerInnen nicht mehr positiv ist, weiß ich auch nicht mehr, wie Demokratie jemals liefern soll. Auch NGOs haben eine Verantwortung nicht nur nach Schlagzeilen zu schielen, sondern sachgerecht zu informieren – nicht zuletzt um Engagement nicht grundlos zu entmutigen.

Ich lasse mich davon jedenfalls nicht mehr länger ärgern. Das Beispiel der Begrenzung der Nahrungsmittelspekulation zeigt: Europäische Demokratie kann funktionieren, wenn es eine aktive Zivilgesellschaft gibt, die grenzüberschreitend mobilisiert. Das haben wir noch viel zu wenig. Allerdings wird das auch in Zukunft kaum gelingen, wenn man die eigenen Erfolge schlechter redet als sie sind, statt sie zu feiern.

Allerdings gilt es kritisch zu bleiben. Denn tatsächlich hängt jetzt viel an ESMA. Die Details müssen dem Geist des Gesetzes entsprechen. Genau darauf weist die Britische NGO World Development Movement zurecht hin. Fast wichtiger ist noch: Europa wird nun als Standort für exzessive Rohstoff- und Agrarspekulation unattraktiver. Um so wichtiger, dass nun in Drittländern noch mehr Druck entsteht. Die Schweizer NGO Brot für Alle nutzt die Vorlage der EU bereits in diese Richtung, um auch in der Schweiz zu ähnlichen Regeln zu kommen.

Weiterlesen:  Hier gibt es eine Übersicht über die Details der neuen MiFID Regulierung.

 

Quellen:

http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/220-trade/52565-eu-restricts-food-speculation-and-limits-high-frequency-trading-mifid.html

http://www.attac.at/news/detailansicht/datum/2014/01/15/neue-eu-finanzregeln-mit-grossen-schwaechen.html

http://www.attac.de/startseite/detailansicht/news/nahrungsmittelspekulation-neue-eu-regeln-mit-grossen-schwaechen-1/?no_cache=1&cHash=2621ea985ab47f10937300cdb82e46b1

http://www.misereor.de/presse/pressemeldungen/pressemeldungen-detais/article/misereor-lobt-die-eu.html

http://www.brotfueralle.ch/index.php?id=16&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=846&tx_ttnews[backPid]=8&cHash=5cee537136a5864ef724f36d1d246d6c

http://www.wdm.org.uk/food-and-hunger/eu-takes-historic-step-stop-banks-betting-hunger

http://www.oxfam.org/en/eu/pressroom/reactions/eu-deal-curbing-food-speculation-comes-none-too-soon?utm_source=oxf.am&utm_medium=wgq&utm_content=redirect

http://www.oxfam.de/mahlzeit#nachricht-18210

 

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Informelle Version des beschlossenen Textes zu Positionslimits

(Art. 59 und 60 der neuen Mifid)

 

Article 59

Position limits and position management controls in commodity derivatives

 

1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities, in line with methodology for calculation determined by ESMA, establish and apply position limits on the size of a net position which a person can hold at all times in commodity derivatives traded on trading venues and economically equivalent OTC contracts. The limits shall be set on the basis of all positions held by a person and those held on its behalf at an aggregate group level in order to:

(a) deleted.

(b) prevent market abuse;

(c) support orderly pricing and settlement conditions, including preventing market distorting positions, and ensuring, in particular, convergence between prices of derivatives in the delivery month and spot prices for the underlying commodity, without prejudice to price discovery in the market for the underlying commodity.

Position limits shall not apply to positions held by or on behalf of a non-financial entity and which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activity of that non-financial entity.

2. Position limits shall specify clear quantitative thresholds for the maximum size of a position in a commodity derivative that persons can hold.

2a. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine the methodology for calculation that competent authorities will apply in establishing the spot month position limits and other month’s position limits for physically settled and cash settled commodity derivatives based on the characteristics of the relevant derivative. The methodology for calculation shall take into account at least the following factors:

(a) the maturity of the commodity derivative contracts;

(b) the deliverable supply in the underlying commodity;

(c) the overall open interest in that contract and the overall open interest in other financial instruments with the same underlying commodity;

(d) the volatility  of the relevant markets, including substitute derivatives and the underlying commodity markets;

(e) the number and size of the market participants;

(f) the characteristics of the underlying commodity market, including patterns of production, consumption and transportation to market;

(g) the development of new contracts.

ESMA shall take into account the experiences with the position limits of investment firms or market operators operating a trading venue and other jurisdictions.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by [XXX].

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2b (new). Competent authorities shall set limits for each contract in commodity derivative traded on trading venues based on the methodology for calculation determined by ESMA in accordance with paragraph 2a.  This position limit will include economically equivalent OTC contracts.

Competent authorities shall also review position limits whenever there is a significant change in deliverable supply or open interest or any other significant change in the market, based on the competent authority’s determination of deliverable supply and open interest and reset the position limit in accordance with the methodology for calculation developed by ESMA.

2c. (new) Competent authorities shall notify ESMA of the exact position limits they intend to set in accordance with the methodology for calculation established by ESMA under paragraph 2a. Within 2 months following receipt of the notification, ESMA shall issue an opinion to the competent authority in question assessing the compatibility of position limits with the objectives of paragraph 1 and with the methodology for calculation established by ESMA under paragraph 2a. ESMA shall publish the opinion on its website. The competent authority in question should modify the position limits in accordance with ESMA opinion, or provide ESMA with justification why the change is considered not necessary. Where a competent authority imposes limits contrary to an ESMA opinion, it shall immediately publish on its website a notice fully explaining its reasons for doing so.

Where ESMA determines that a position limit is not in line with the methodology for calculation in paragraph 2a, it shall take action in accordance with its powers under Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2d.(new) Where the same commodity derivative is traded in significant volumes on trading venues in more than one jurisdiction, the competent authority of the venue where the largest volume of trading takes place (the central competent authority) shall set the single position limit to be applied on all trading in that contract. The central competent authority shall consult the competent authorities of other venues on which this derivative is traded in significant volumes on the single position limit to be applied and any revisions to this single position limits. Where competent authorities do not agree, they shall state in writing the full and detailed reasons why they consider that the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 are not met. ESMA shall settle any dispute arising from a disagreement between competent authorities in accordance with its powers under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

 

The competent authorities of the venues where the same commodity derivative is traded and the competent authorities of position holders in that commodity derivative should put in place cooperation arrangements including exchange of relevant data with each other and to enable the monitoring and enforcement of the single position limit.

 

2e. (new) ESMA shall monitor at least once a year the way competent authorities have implemented the position limits set in accordance with the methodology for calculation established by ESMA under paragraph 2(a). In doing so, ESMA shall ensure that a single position limit effectively applies to the same contract irrespective of where it is traded in line with paragraph 2(d).

 

3. Member States shall ensure that an investment firm or a market operator operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives apply position management controls. These controls shall include at least, the powers for the trading venue to:

(a) monitor the open interest positions of persons;

(b) access information, including all relevant documentation, from persons about the size and purpose of a position or exposure entered into, information about beneficial or underlying owners, any concert arrangements, and any related assets or liabilities in the underlying market;

(c) require a person to terminate or reduce a position, on a temporary or permanent basis as the specific case may require and to unilaterally take appropriate action to ensure the termination or reduction if the person does not comply; and

(d) where appropriate, require a person to provide liquidity back into the market at an agreed price and volume on a temporary basis with the express intent of mitigating the effects of a large or dominant position.4. The position limits and position management controls shall be transparent and non-discriminatory, specifying how they apply to persons and taking account of the nature and composition of market participants and of the use they make of the contracts submitted to trading.

5. The investment firm or market operator operating the trading venue shall inform the competent authority of the details of position management controls.

The competent authority shall communicate the same information as well as the details of the position limits it has established to ESMA, which shall publish and maintain on its website a database with summaries of the position limits and position management controls.

6. The position limits of the paragraph 1 shall take precedence over any measures imposed by competent authorities pursuant to Article 71(1)(p), unless these measures are more restrictive than those adopted in accordance with paragraph 8.

7a. (new) ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine:

(a) the criteria and methods for determining whether a position qualifies as reducing risks directly related to commercial activities;

(b) the methods to determine when positions of a person should be aggregated within a group;

(c) the criteria for determining whether a contract is an economically equivalent OTC contract to that traded on a traded venue, referred to in paragraph 1, in a way that facilitates the reporting of positions taken in equivalent OTC contracts to the relevant competent authority as determined in article 60 par. 1a;

(d) the definition of what constitutes the same commodity derivative and significant volumes under paragraph 2a;

(e) the methodology for aggregating and netting OTC and on-venue commodity derivatives positions to establish the net position for purposes of assessing compliance with the limits. Such methodologies should establish criteria to determine which positions may be netted against one another and should not facilitate the build-up of positions in a manner inconsistent with the objectives stated in Paragraph 1;

(f) the procedure setting out how persons may notify and apply for the exemption under paragraph 1 and how the relevant competent authority will approve such applications;

(g) the method for calculation to determine the venue where the largest volume of trading in a commodity derivative takes place and significant volumes under paragraph 2d.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by [XXX].

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

8. Competent authorities shall not impose limits which are more restrictive than those adopted pursuant to paragraph [x] except in exceptional cases where they are objectively justified and proportionate taking into account the liquidity of the specific market and the orderly functioning of that market. Competent authorities shall publish on their website the details of the restrictive position limits they decide to impose, which shall be valid for an initial period not exceeding six months from the date of their publication on the website […]. The restrictive position limits may be renewed for further periods not exceeding six months at a time if the grounds for the restriction continue to be applicable. If […] not renewed after that six-month period, they shall automatically expire.

Where competent authorities decide to impose more restrictive position limits, they shall notify ESMA. The notification shall include a justification for the more restrictive position limits. ESMA shall, within 24 hours, issue an opinion on whether it considers that the restrictive position limits are necessary to address the exceptional case. The opinion shall be published on ESMA’s website.

Where a competent authority imposes limits contrary to an ESMA opinion, it shall immediately publish on its website a notice fully explaining its reasons for doing so.

9. Member States shall provide that competent authorities can apply their sanctioning powers under this directive for the breaches of position limits set according to this Article to:

(a) positions held by persons situated or operating in its territory or abroad which exceed the limits on commodity derivatives contracts the competent authority has set in relation to contracts on trading venues situated or operating in its territory or economically equivalent contracts;

(b) positions held by persons situated or operating in its territory which exceed the limits on commodity derivatives contracts set by competent authorities in other Member States.

 

 

Article 60

 

Position reporting by categories of position holders

1. Member States shall ensure that an investment firm or a market operator operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof:

(a) make public a weekly report with the aggregate positions held by the different categories of persons for the different commodity derivatives traded on their trading venue, specifying the number of long and short positions by such categories, changes thereto since the previous report, the percentage of the total open interest represented by each category and the number of persons holding a position in each category in accordance with paragraph 3 and communicate this report to the competent authority and to ESMA; ESMA shall proceed to a centralised publication of the information included in these reports.

 

(b) provide the competent authority with a complete breakdown of the positions held by all persons, including the members or participants and the clients thereof, on that trading venue, at least on a daily basis.

The obligation laid down in point (a) shall only apply when both the number of persons and their open positions exceed minimum thresholds.

 

1a. Member States shall ensure that investment firms trading in commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof outside a trading venue provide the competent authority of the trading venue where the commodity derivative is traded or the central competent authority where the commodity derivative is traded in significant volumes on trading venues in more than one jurisdiction at least on a daily basis with a complete breakdown of their positions taken in commodity derivatives traded on a trading venue and equivalent OTC contracts, as well as of those of their clients, the clients of those clients and so until the end client is reached, in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No …/…[MiFIR] and, where applicable, of Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011.

 

2. In order to enable monitoring of compliance with paragraph 1 of Article 59, Member States shall require members or participants of regulated markets and MTFs and clients of OTFs […] to report to the investment firm or market operator operating that trading venue, the details of their own positions held through contracts traded on that trading venue at least on a daily basis, as well as those of their clients, the clients of those clients and so on until the end client is reached.

 

3. Persons holding positions in a commodity derivative or emission allowance or derivative thereof shall be classified by the investment firm or market operator operating that trading venue according to the nature of their main business, taking account of any applicable authorisation, as either:

(a) investment firms as defined in Directive 2004/39/EC or credit institution as defined in Directive 2006/48/EC;

(b) investment funds, either an undertaking for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC, or an alternative investment fund manager as defined in Directive 2011/61/EC;

(c) other financial institutions, including insurance undertakings and reinsurance undertakings as defined in Directive 2009/138/EC, and institutions for occupational retirement provision as defined in Directive 2003/41/EC;

(d) commercial undertakings;

(e) in the case of emission allowances or derivatives thereof, operators with compliance obligations under Directive 2003/87/EC.

 

The reports referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 shall specify the number of long and short positions by category of persons, any changes thereto since the previous report, percent of total open interest represented by each category, and the number of persons in each category

 

The reports referred to in paragraph 1(a) and in paragraph 1a should differentiate between:

(a) positions identified as positions which in an objectively measurable way reduce risks directly related to commercial activities; and

(b) other positions.

 

4. ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the format of the reports referred to in paragraph 1(a)and  paragraph 1a,.

 

ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by […]*.

*          OJ please insert date: x months after the date of entry into force of this Directive.

 

Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

 

In the case of emission allowances or derivatives thereof, the reporting shall not prejudice the compliance obligations under Directive 2003/87/EC //.

 

5. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 94 concerning measures to specify the thresholds referred to in the last subparagraph of paragraph 1, having regard to the total number of open positions and their size and the total number of persons holding a position.

 

5a. ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the measures to require all reports referred in point (a) of paragraph 1 to be sent to ESMA at a specified weekly time, for the centralised publication by the latter.

ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by […] *. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

 

 

 

 

 

Rubrik: Mein Europa

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