Here you find a short version of the study commissioned by my colleague Dr. Franziska Brantner and me, written by René Repasi from the Institute of German and European Corporate and Business Law, University of Heidelberg:
“Legal issues of the Single European Supervisory Mechanism”
Key findings:
A.
A full-fledged single supervision mechanism which is democratically accountable to the European Parliament and covers all credit institutions established within the Internal Market is legally possible if politically wanted. Decision-making powers which are necessary in order to facilitate the uni- form implementation and application of EU financial market regulation, including the right to take individual decisions, can be conferred upon such a mechanism by the EU legislator if they are clearly defined by the empowering act and if their exercise is controlled efficiently by the political Union institutions European Parliament and Council.
B.
The democratic accountability of the banking supervision exercised by the European Central Bank is not prevented by the independence of the ECB.
C.
The exercise of the banking supervision by the European Central Bank requires a direct democratic accountability vis-à-vis the European Parliament in order to comply with the principle of democracy protected by Member States’ Constitutions.
D.
The decision-making within the European Central Bank lies with the Governing Council. Non- Euro Member States cannot participate in this decision-making process. They can only participate in the new Supervisory Board that is responsible for “planning and execution” of the banking supervision. They can receive voting rights within this Supervisory Board.